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AbstrAct
Functional MRI (fMRI) of fully awake and unrestrained 
dog ’volunteers’ has been proven an effective tool to 
understand the neural circuitry and functioning of the 
canine brain. Although every dog owner would vouch 
that dogs are perceptive, cognitive, intuitive and capable 
of positive emotions/empathy, as indeed substantiated 
by ethological studies for some time, neurological 
investigations now corroborate this. These studies show 
that there exists a striking similarity between dogs 
and humans in the functioning of the caudate nucleus 
(associated with pleasure and emotion), and dogs 
experience positive emotions, empathic-like responses 
and demonstrate human bonding which, some scientists 
claim, may be at least comparable with human children. 
There exists an area analogous to the ’voice area’ in the 
canine brain, enabling dogs to comprehend and respond 
to emotional cues/valence in human voices, and evidence 
of a region in the temporal cortex of dogs involved in 
the processing of faces, as also observed in humans 
and monkeys. We therefore contend that using dogs in 
invasive and/or harmful research, and toxicity testing, 
cannot be ethically justifiable.
IntroductIon
More than 200 000 dogs are used worldwide in 
‘harmful’ research and toxicity testing (experi-
ments likely to cause pain, suffering and distress, 
not conducted for veterinary purposes, and often 
terminal) every year, with much of these used as the 
non-rodent species in the evaluation of the safety of 
new drugs and chemicals. This continues in spite of 
opposition by the majority of the public, and also 
formidable scientific and ethical arguments against 
it. For example, recent analyses have shown that 
the testing of new human drugs in dogs has little 
or no scientific basis or justification, because canine 
data are not significantly predictive of the efficacy 
and safety of new drugs in humans.1 This is due, in 
part, to major differences in the cytochrome P450 
‘CYP’ enzymes that metabolise drugs.2 These differ-
ences, in level, activity and amino acid sequence, 
occur even between breeds and strains of the same 
species, meaning extrapolation of data between 
species, such as between dogs and humans, is unre-
liable (see ref 3). Ethical concerns are based on the 
stressful nature of the laboratory environment, 
and experimental manipulations and procedures 
that often may also be painful and terminal (see, 
eg, ref 4). Dogs are known to react to unfamiliar 
objects, sounds, people, situations and manipu-
lations, as well as restraint and association with 
prior unpleasant experiences, with reactions known 
to reliably indicate conflict and stress, as well as 
anxious postures (see ref 5). Barren, restricted 
environments (common features of most laboratory 
kennels), kennel noise and restricted sight lines are 
acknowledged stressors, and together these factors 
lead to well-characterised stereotypies—repeti-
tive, invariant behaviour patterns with no obvious 
goal or function, which include circling, pacing, 
whirling, jumping, wall bouncing, and repetitive 
grooming or self-biting—as well as other abnormal 
behaviours such as polydipsia or polyphagia (eating 
and drinking to a great degree), compulsive staring 
and excessive barking, for example (see ref 5).
Such welfare concerns constitute a large part of 
the ethical objection to dog experimentation. A 
variety of ethical approaches exist (recently and 
elegantly summarised in a report by the Oxford 
Centre for Animal Ethics,6 and, eg, the works of 
Peter Singer,7 Tom Regan8 and others). One is 
instrumentalism, in which dogs are viewed as scien-
tific instruments, a means to an end to be used in 
experiments for the benefit of humans, or even to 
increase knowledge, usually providing there is no 
unnecessary cruelty. Although it may be argued that 
no dog experiments are absolutely instrumentalist, 
as the welfare of the dogs is considered alongside 
human benefits (see below), it may be argued that 
some dog experiments are—or almost are—prac-
tically instrumentalist because they are approved 
and conducted even in the face of low likelihood 
of success, and/or low benefit and/or high severity 
(based on animal welfare scientist Patrick Bateson’s 
3D Cube9). Another is an approach based on dogs’ 
rights to life and to not be harmed, precluding their 
use in scientific experiments at all, or at the very 
least in invasive research that is likely to infringe 
these rights and to cause them pain and suffering. 
This approach is based on societal morals, increas-
ingly underpinned by scientific knowledge, that, it 
is argued, afford rights to and acknowledge attri-
butes in non-humans such as dogs, which include 
intrinsic worth as individuals, with lives deserving 
of respect, and therefore a right not to be harmed 
(unless it is for their own good, such as in remedial 
surgery). Such attributes include the capacity for 
various emotions, feelings and cognitive abilities, 
including pain, shock, fear, foreboding, trauma, 
anxiety, stress, distress, anticipation and terror, 
as well as positive attributes such as pleasure, joy, 
anticipation, rewards and so on. These elevate the 
ethical status of dogs and challenge moral anthro-
pocentrism (that humans should always have 
absolute priority in our moral thinking), instru-
mentalism (that animals exist for human beings, 
to serve their interests) and dualism (that humans 
should be distinguished and separated from other 
animals).6 There are also utilitarian or ‘greater 
good’ approaches of variable ‘stringency’, in which 
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the harms caused to the dogs in experiments are weighed against 
the benefits they provide to humans (involving a ‘harm:benefit 
analysis’ (HBA)). While a rights-based approach, rather than a 
utilitarian perspective, is the standpoint taken by the authors, 
the latter is the dominant form of reasoning within science,10 
and therefore is the rationale we use to argue against dog exper-
imentation in this review.
In assessing harms to dogs from experimentation—central to the 
HBA—it is clearly of paramount importance to attempt to correctly 
establish and appreciate the genuine level of suffering the dogs 
experience. This is heavily dependent on an accurate comprehen-
sion of their sentience—something we argue is not done currently, 
and which therefore, along with general exaggeration of human 
benefits, leads to the HBA being greatly skewed and biased (see 
Discussion and Conclusion). Efforts to better understand canine 
sentience, however, continue and are more powerful than ever. 
Alongside this growing concern about the use of dogs in harmful 
experiments, there have been increasing efforts to understand the 
canine mind. For many years, this has been elucidated via ethological 
research, which, while elegant and greatly informative, may suffer 
from inherent vagaries and inconclusive inferences, and can only 
go so far.11 Such limits and caveats, however, are inherent in any 
approach, and these should not negate or detract from the weight of 
evidence. Simply applying Occam’s razor, it is abundantly obvious 
that animals behave as though they feel pleasure. For instance, they 
play—something not restricted to primates and, for example, dogs, 
but which extends to many species, including many birds, reptiles, 
fishes and cephalopods (see refs 12 13). They also appear to take 
great pleasure in food and sex, act as though they enjoy touch and 
physical sensations such as sunbathing, seem to experience various 
emotions and many more (see refs 13–15). In spite of these, there 
has always existed a poor attitude in part of the scientific commu-
nity, and at large—rightly criticised by many—that insists on ever 
more ‘proof ’ of these qualities in non-humans, or denying non-hu-
mans these experiences and abilities while simply accepting them in 
humans (human sentience is no more ‘provable’, scientifically); a 
quasi-embargo of properly addressing these concepts or at least on 
avoiding their discussion in any great detail.13 All these things are 
scientifically and ethically inconsistent, and therefore they result in 
poorer and less ethical science.12 13
It is of course difficult, if not impossible, to prove sentience 
in other beings; that is accepted. However, we readily accept 
the existence of sentience in other humans based on weight of 
evidence, and consistency—and science—demand we ought to 
do likewise with non-humans.13 Further, the quest to under-
stand canine cognition and sentience has taken great strides in 
recent years, with non-invasive functional MRI (fMRI) scanning 
of fully awake, unrestrained, trained volunteer dogs, which 
was first reported in 2012 by Gregory Berns’ group (Emory 
University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA).16 Unlike many experiments 
involving dogs, these imaging investigations may be regarded as 
not ethically troublesome, in that they involve neither dedicated 
breeding and housing of dogs specifically for experimentation, 
nor techniques that are invasive and/or harmful to those dogs, 
and they would not, therefore, be considered as ‘animal experi-
ments’ in most countries’ legislation. Those who may have moral 
objections to harmful dog experiments generally, including the 
authors, therefore have no objections to this type of research 
in principle. Indeed, it is helping the ethical case against using 
dogs in invasive/harmful research, as it has helped to ‘fill the gap’ 
left by traditional methods of study, allowing investigation of 
how dogs’ brains function with regard to what they perceive, the 
similarity of their emotional responses to those of humans, their 
cognitive abilities and their social intelligence.17 Together with a 
surge in canine cognition research generally, both neuroscientific 
and behavioural, there is now substantial evidence to support the 
contention that dogs are able to perceive, feel and understand 
much more deeply than previously thought. Examples include 
the activity of the brain’s caudate nucleus, which is associated 
with pleasure and emotion; the comprehension of language and 
emotion in human voices; and the processing of faces and facial 
expressions (see ref 17).
In this brief review, we discuss recent evidence in this field, 
including claims by some researchers that canine cognition and 
sentience are much more advanced than previously accepted. We 
argue that scientific evidence demands we reassess and redefine 
the way we treat dogs, and give dogs the protection they conse-
quently deserve from any act or procedure that would cause 
pain, distress or harm.
recent research on canine cognition
The caudate nucleus shows important similarities in humans and 
dogs
The caudate nucleus is a structure deep in the brain (part of the 
basal ganglia), which, among other things, is associated with 
positive emotions and expectations, enjoyment, social rewards, 
learning and memory (see ref 17). For the first time, in 2012, 
Berns et al reported on fMRI studies of fully awake and unre-
strained dogs showing similarities in caudate activity in dogs and 
humans. Dogs presented with human hand signals that were 
associated with a food reward showed a response in the caudate 
nucleus that was not present with hand signals associated with 
no food reward, in a manner similar to experiments on both 
humans and non-human primates.16 A subsequent investigation 
validated these findings in a greater number of dogs, showing 
that this caudate response was similar to a comparable human 
study, and that caudate activation was actually more consistent 
in dogs than in humans.18 To further understand the significance 
of human interaction in the lives of dogs, the same researchers 
(Berns et al) investigated canine brain responses to familiar 
and unfamiliar human and dog odours.17 On average, only the 
‘familiar human scent’ activated the caudate nucleus in dogs, 
suggesting that reward response is reserved for familiar humans 
rather than conspecifics, and that not only did dogs discriminate 
that scent from the others, but that they had a positive associa-
tion with it. They concluded that, beyond illustrating the power 
of the dogs’ sense of smell, this underlines the importance of 
human bonding and attachment in the lives of dogs.
Dogs are highly sensitive to verbal/visual communication and to 
human emotions
Dogs are exquisitely sensitive to verbal communication. Experi-
ments have shown that they understand elements of speech, and, 
similarly to humans, use different parts of the brain to process 
its verbal components and its emotion and intonation. In other 
words, they pay attention to what we say and also to how we say 
it.19 Recent fMRI experiments have suggested a dedicated ‘voice 
area’ in the canine brain, similar to those located in the human 
and macaque brain.20 21 This first evidence of a ‘voice area’ in a 
non-primate was suggested by way of fMRI scanning of awake, 
unrestrained dogs, in which it was noted that human and dog 
brains show great similarities in the processing of emotionally 
loaded sounds (not sentences or words) in an area near the 
primary auditory cortex, allowing the perception of a speaker’s 
identity and emotional state, for example.22
As well as being sensitive to verbal communication, dogs are 
also extremely sensitive to cues that signal communicative intent, 
in a manner previously attributed only to human infants.23 For 
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example, they seem able to take into account humans’ visual 
attention (ie, where they are looking) when making decisions 
and deliberating actions. Studies have shown that dogs have 
empathic responses to humans in distress, not limited to those 
whom they know/with whom they have a connection; they 
may be able to morally evaluate—in essence, to try to deter-
mine the difference between what is right and what is wrong 
in a personal situation by using logic—are in tune with human 
emotions, and to some degree may be able to understand how 
we are feeling and want to ‘help’ with behaviours that are ‘…
consistent with empathic concern and comfort-offering’, though 
which could be interpreted as emotional contagion.24 25 For 
example, moral behaviours such as altruism, tolerance, forgive-
ness, reciprocity and fairness are evident in the play of canids: 
they have rules to ensure that play is not misinterpreted as 
spoiling for a fight, which include clear communication (like 
the ‘play bow’), assessing partners’ abilities to help establish 
an even footing (involving self-handicapping and submission), 
apologetic behaviour including understanding and forgiveness if 
things go too far, and sincerity and fairness (see ref 26). In exper-
iments similar to those performed in human investigations, dogs 
oriented towards humans—whether familiar or strange—when 
they were crying, rather than talking or humming, consistent 
with behaviour regarded as expressing empathic concern. They 
also appear to discriminate human emotions from human facial 
expressions, not limited to the mouth.27 Indeed, there is evidence 
that—in common with primates for whom facial recognition 
and processing is very important—dogs also process facial infor-
mation,28 discriminating faces based on species and novelty.29 
Further, fMRI experiments suggest that this is effected by dedi-
cated neural ‘face processing’ circuitry in visual cortical areas, 
rather than due to purely associative mechanisms (eg, associating 
a face with a meaningful outcome, such as food) in reward areas 
of the brain30; and, crucially, recent (2016) experiments have 
shown that dogs are able to integrate emotional information 
from visual (facial) and auditory (vocal) cues and inputs—the first 
time that integration of heterospecific emotional expressions in 
a species other than humans, as well as cross-modal integration 
of conspecific emotional expressions beyond primates, has been 
demonstrated.31 The ethical significance of all of this lies in the 
importance to dogs of recognising others (canine and human) 
and their mental/emotional states and intentions, in facilitating 
social interactions and functional relationships (both short and 
long term), in communication, and in the ability to anticipate the 
behaviour of others and adapt and respond to situations quickly 
and appropriately in order to increase chances of survival.27–29 31
In summary, recent research may suggest that dogs are highly 
sensitive to cues that signal intent; can show empathic concern; 
have ‘voice areas’ in their brains similar to those of primates, 
enabling them to perceive emotions associated with vocal 
communications; can process and recognise faces, as well as 
perceive emotion from facial expressions; and can understand 
complexities of verbal content.
dIscussIon And conclusIon
The ability to train volunteer dogs (who have the opportunity 
to opt out) to lie still while undergoing fMRI scans has recently 
opened up new avenues of research into canine cognition and 
greatly augmented what we can learn from ethological studies 
in this field. As reviewed here, fMRI studies of the canine brain 
have revealed positive and consistent responses in the caudate 
nucleus, specifically the nucleus accumbens, to objects and 
stimuli, including human individuals, that dogs liked. Positive 
emotions are invariably linked to caudate activations; specific 
parts of the caudate stand out for their consistent activation 
to many things that humans enjoy, and indeed caudate activa-
tion is so consistent that, under the right circumstances, it can 
predict our preferences for food, music and even beauty.17 
Canine responses were of a manner and magnitude similar to 
caudate responses in humans—a functional homology that may 
be indicative of dogs experiencing similar emotions to humans.18 
Further fMRI investigations, combined with behavioural studies, 
have demonstrated the sensitivity of dogs to human social 
interaction/bonding, and that dogs may prefer the company of 
familiar humans over the company of either familiar or unfa-
miliar dogs,32 33 and that dogs may have evolved mechanisms 
especially tuned to social cues and therefore may have special-
ised neural machinery for face processing.33–35 Dogs seem able to 
understand a significant amount of human language, including 
both verbal and emotional content.
In other words, there is formidable and mounting evidence 
illustrating and underlining the complex cognitive and emotional 
capacities of dogs. It is important to note that such evidence has, 
however, existed for some time from ethological studies, and 
indeed many would argue it has simply been obvious from the 
most cursory of observations to those who have interacted with 
dogs that they (and, in fact, many other non-human species) are 
intelligent, emotional and highly sentient beings. Such etholog-
ical investigations have demonstrated, and increasingly illus-
trate, the depth and breadth of their cognitive and emotional 
capacities. A recent review (2016) cites observational ethology 
and problem-solving experiments in the early 1970s and 1980s 
as being part of a ‘rediscovery’ of canine cognition investiga-
tions and comparative studies.36 It cites numerous supporting 
studies that have increased our understanding of cognition in 
dogs, for example via tracking of eye movements (elucidating 
interest, preference, planning, intent, emotional perception and 
processing), touch-sensitive screens (recognition, categorisation, 
communication) and others, as well as non-invasive studies of 
canine neurobiology including electroencephalography (EEG) 
and fMRI. fMRI data have not, therefore, ‘reinvented the 
wheel’, but they have, importantly, expanded the methods by 
which scientists can access the minds of other animals, and this is 
an important move. Arguably, it should not really be necessary to 
prove to any greater degree what seems clear, when considering 
the suffering experienced by dogs undergoing invasive experi-
ments, although the fact that this may be an inconvenient truth 
to a scientific establishment that uses many tens of thousands 
of dogs every year as research subjects may be a factor. Never-
theless, it seems—belatedly perhaps—that the deep, advanced, 
and in some ways ‘human-like’ nature of canine cognition and 
emotions are finally being recognised by the scientific commu-
nity, given the degree and type of research being funded and 
conducted. fMRI data are cementing this, by showing us the 
mechanisms behind these qualities, which parts of the canine 
brain are working to achieve them and how. It means that dogs 
must, and do, suffer much more than is accepted currently 
within part of the scientific community, as evidenced by the type 
of dog research being conducted, the number of dogs used and 
the suffering associated with some procedures (see Introduc-
tion). This has profound and serious consequences for the use of 
dogs in harmful experiments and toxicity testing.
One omnipresent caveat of any discussion of fMRI data, 
despite more than quarter of a century of human fMRI studies 
and use, is their reliability, and the question of what fMRI images 
specifically represent in terms of neural activity (see ref 37 for a 
discussion). While the exact basis and mechanistic nature of fMRI 
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images are somewhat controversial and remain under scrutiny 
even now, it is generally accepted, based on much evidence, that 
the fMRI signal—based as it is on blood flow and oxygen levels 
(‘blood oxygen-level dependent [BOLD] signals’)—accurately 
represents neural activity. Another potential criticism is that the 
fMRI images central to the argument we present in this paper are 
simply evidencing neural activity associated with various stimuli 
and behaviours, as opposed to being correlates of conscious 
experiences. This type of argument is not novel, of course—
even for humans—and it is accepted that the evidence herein 
and its like cannot prove conscious experiences. Nonetheless, 
there is increasing and convincing evidence from human studies 
(of course, humans can follow detailed and complex orders, and 
report verbally to researchers) that neuroimaging data strongly 
correlate to various mental states. An in-depth review published 
in 2015 describes how neuroimaging technologies such as fMRI 
and EEG can reveal detailed aspects of, for example, decisions, 
intentions, thoughts, imagining tasks, behavioural will and 
others in humans.38 For example, in humans, fMRI signatures 
(‘brain activation patterns’) correctly identified intentions to 
perform specific tasks in 80% of instances,39 revealed movement 
intentions before their initiation40 and identified the type and 
duration of task being imagined with a mean accuracy of 95%.41 
Further support for the assertion of conscious experience versus 
stimuli/behaviour-associated neural activity has been provided 
by human research showing that imagining performing tasks 
generates highly similar patterns of brain activity to actually 
performing them, exemplified by imagining limb movement,42 
spatial navigation43 and playing tennis.44 In other words, fMRI 
patterns can be used as neural proxies for behaviour. Further, the 
evidence above is augmented and fortified by many studies that 
have been conducted over the past two decades,45 46 comparing, 
for instance, imaging patterns in (1) healthy individuals and 
in patients assumed to be in a vegetative state or minimally 
conscious, and (2) in similar comparative experiments in humans 
who are awake and asleep. The former have demonstrated that 
many forms of awareness and cognition exist in some people 
in vegetative states, in whom specific neuroimaging patterns 
are indistinguishable from healthy individuals, and which are 
therefore indicative of actual conscious experiences, even to 
the degree that people assumed to be in a vegetative state can 
communicate, understand and respond to spoken commands 
and questions (eg, ref 47 and see ref 38). For example, persons 
fulfilling all agreed criteria for being in a vegetative state or mini-
mally conscious show the same fMRI patterns when instructed 
to perform mental imaging tasks, such as the tennis playing and 
spatial navigation just described.48 The latter, comparing awake 
and asleep individuals, have shown that diverse mental states, 
including discrete emotional states and experiences, have asso-
ciated ‘brain states’ in the form of ‘coherent, emotion-specific 
patterns’,49–51 supporting the theory that ‘…posit emotions are 
represented categorically in the coordinated activity of separable 
neural substrates’.52 A recent (2016) review53 cites work demon-
strating in humans that valenced brain states can be differen-
tiated on the basis of neural activity (eg, refs 54 55), including 
an experiment showing that nine different emotions could be 
predicted by fMRI activity, with an accuracy of 84% with the 
same subject and 70% with different subjects.56 The same review 
reported the authors’ own work, showing that fMRI could 
classify six different emotions with 37.3% accuracy, compared 
with chance levels of 14.3%.53 57 Meta-analyses corroborate and 
strengthen this. Hamann11 summarised a number of these in 
his review.11 For example, the five basic emotions of happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear and disgust are ‘characterised by consistent 
neural correlates’ and can be reliably discriminated from each 
other,58 and ‘consistent regional brain activations’ correspond to 
each basic emotion category.59 More recently, Wager et al60 anal-
ysed almost 150 studies involving well over 2000 participants, 
and concluded similarly that the five basic emotion categories 
are identifiable via patterns of brain activation, revealed by 
fMRI, across multiple brain systems such as ‘the cortex, thal-
amus, amygdala, and other structures’.
The use of dogs in invasive and/or harmful experiments, as 
for other non-human species, currently rests on the aforemen-
tioned HBA (see Introduction)—that harms to the animals used 
must be minimised, and the benefits to others (often humans) 
from those experiments must be substantial. It can be argued 
that HBA analyses are not currently conducted appropriately. 
Inter alia, they are not conducted transparently; are often, if not 
always, rudimentary; are performed by individuals who have 
heavily invested in animal research; and the failure of animal 
experiments to translate to human benefits is not fully consid-
ered.10 The harms—as mentioned in the Introduction—we 
argue are considerable, yet at the same time underappreciated 
and underacknowledged, especially so in light of the fMRI infor-
mation reviewed herein.4 These issues have been of sufficient 
importance to stimulate research into the living conditions and 
suffering of dogs in laboratories, as well as changes in these 
conditions to improve the welfare of these dogs. Significantly, 
however, attempts to ameliorate laboratory conditions for dogs 
(and also therefore to improve data from dog experiments) by 
providing social housing may still be inadequate: some dogs still 
become stressed, anguished, frustrated and bored, and it appears 
that at the very least more human social contact may be a sine 
qua non.61 Evidence overall, therefore, reveals that harms from 
experimentation to the dogs involved may be much greater, 
widespread and intractable than previously accepted, skewing 
the HBA balance and demanding any benefits be much greater 
to redress it. Yet it increasingly appears that this HBA ratio is 
skewed even further by the actual value of dog experiments to 
humans (see, eg, refs 1–3), which, as exemplified in the Introduc-
tion, we believe is much less than is claimed by advocates of dog 
research.
In conclusion, in accordance with our intuitions, simple 
observation and experience, ethological/behavioural research 
and fMRI experiments, dogs are able to morally evaluate; don’t 
just ‘hear’ and have a basic understanding of some words, but 
also ‘listen’ to human intonation to perceive emotional states 
and intent; understand to some degree human ‘communicative 
intent’ and perspective, involving to a large extent the eyes; 
possess neural machinery for face processing, enabling identi-
fication and perception of emotions; and so on. Perhaps most 
importantly and crucially, dogs are able to experience positive 
emotions, empathic-like responses and demonstrate human 
bonding at least comparable with human children, via similar 
neural mechanisms: ‘…there is a consensus that the mind of a 
dog is very similar in capacity and behaviors to the mind of a 
human 2 to 3 year-old’,62 and ‘The ability to experience positive 
emotions, like love and attachment, would mean that dogs have 
a level of sentience comparable to that of a human child. And 
this ability suggests a rethinking of how we treat dogs’.63
It is this degree of (and type of) sentience that is at the crux 
of this review, and of its conclusions and demands for change. 
We argue that the evidence for the extent of canine sentience 
was already out there from ethological studies, but we also show 
the evidence collated herein comprising recent, ethical fMRI 
brain imaging of ‘volunteer’ dogs augments and fortifies it. Our 
inference of these canine fMRI experiments, and the weight of 
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evidence regarding what they indicate, is supported by fMRI 
experiments involving humans—comparative studies involving 
healthy, asleep, minimally conscious and vegetative state individ-
uals—showing that imaging ‘brain activation patterns’ are reli-
able indicators of conscious thoughts, intentions and emotional 
states/feelings. Because all this evidence shows that dog cognition 
and sentience are advanced and complex, and that dogs must 
experience a variety of emotions, including positive emotions 
such as love/attachment, pleasure and empathy, we argue that 
this should prompt a more empathic view and response from 
us—particularly, perhaps, from ethicists and others involved in 
HBAs and approving, licensing and conducting invasive exper-
iments involving dogs. Because HBAs, by their nature, assume 
some degree of uncertainty about feelings and emotions in dogs, 
our review challenges this assumption and demands a change in 
how HBAs are performed. My colleagues and I would argue, 
based on what we see as formidable evidence, that HBAs must as 
a matter of urgency factor in this evidence, and the associated and 
inescapable conclusion that canine feelings and emotions are real 
and genuine—and therefore dogs in laboratories and in invasive 
and harmful experiments suffer much more than we currently 
accept, resulting in greater harm. This is a position supported by 
philosophical and ethical deliberations: Peter Singer argues that 
sentience gives rise to interests, and these involve pursuing and 
experiencing pleasure, as well as avoiding pain and suffering64; 
Tom Regan, that lives involving pleasure have intrinsic value65; 
the ability to experience pleasure leads to a capacity for quality 
of life66; and others. Harm to animals in laboratories, therefore, 
results when pain or suffering results directly from experimental 
procedures, caging and so on, and from denying those animals 
much of their agency, control over their circumstances and the 
freedom to pursue their natural behaviours and associated plea-
sures (eg, exercising, foraging, exploring, choosing social part-
ners and so on13 67 68). Further, there is a strong argument that 
animal welfare is compromised if an individual cannot flourish 
emotionally, and that happiness and pleasure (and so unhappi-
ness and suffering) depend on emotions and moods, as well as 
pleasant and unpleasant experiences.69
We think it is fitting to conclude with neuroscientist Gregory 
Berns’ statement following his work: ‘The fMRI data makes it 
harder to deny that dogs have feelings very much like we do 
and that they deserve a consideration under the law that treats 
them as more than a piece of furniture. We have raised the bar 
for treating the dogs as sentient individuals with free will. There 
are still over 50 000 dogs used in research every year [in the U.S. 
alone], so it is an uphill battle. Most of these dogs are either bred 
as ‘laboratory-dogs’ – usually beagles – or are acquired from 
shelters. I hope that our research will show that dogs have many 
of the same emotions that we do, and that it will become harder 
to justify using them as research subjects’.70
The authors believe that regulatory authorities worldwide 
should recognise the urgency to review and re-evaluate the need, 
ethics and legalities of the use of dogs in invasive research and 
testing, given our current knowledge and increasing scientific 
evidence of dog sentience and cognition.
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